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1. Introduction
In the vast literature stemming from the seminal contributions by Kyle (1985) and Back
(1992), a typical insider trading game involves three players: an informed trader (or insider),
a market maker, and uninformed (or noise) traders. The informed trader possesses long-
lived information about the true fundamental value of an asset. She attempts to maximize
profits from trading on this information before it is revealed at some known future date. The
market maker has a prior belief about probability distribution of the asset value. He must
attempt to form expectations about the fundamental value of the asset from the total order
flow comprising uninformed and informed traders. This simple game theoretical setup has
spawned many extensions and empirical applications over the years. However, they have ran
into severe limitations, in large part because of the difficult filtering problem faced by the
market maker.
This paper presents an approach to the continuous-time Kyle-Back problem which dra-
matically expands the universe of models where an equilibrium can be found. Based on the
theory we develop, a straightforward methodology can be implemented to solve classes of
problems that were previously too complex to study. In particular, we are able to tackle multi-
dimensional insider problems which can include (simultaneously) multiple assets, multiple
options at different strikes, arbitrary non-Gaussian price priors, and arbitrary but determin-
istic covariances accross noise trading. The key ingredient of our method is a long-standing,
but recently flourishing, mathematical theory known as optimal transport1. We show that
the pricing rule of the market maker at maturity can be viewed as an optimal transport map.
It connects the distribution of noise trading to that of the market maker’s prior belief for the
fundamental value of the assets. The optimal control of the informed trader then reduces
to the computation of a conjugate convex function, explicit in some cases, and otherwise
easily obtained numerically, using efficient algorithms such as the Sinkhorn (Cuturi, 2013).
The prices of the assets as a function of the order flows become a simple convolution of
the transport map (the solution of a partial differential equation using the Feyman-Kac for-
mula), trivial to compute. In essence, optimal transport makes the market maker’s filtering
problem feasible in a wide range of previously intractable cases.
To illustrate our methodology, we focus in on the problem of informed trading between
a spot and an options markets. The model of Back (1993) remains the state-of-the-art for
this problem. Many important insights have emerged from this contribution, in particular
1The optimal transport theory used in our paper is the classical optimal transport theory (see in particu-
lar Brenier, 1991; McCann, 1995; Villani, 2009). As opposed to martingale optimal transport theory studied
in mathematical finance (Beiglböck, Nutz, and Touzi, 2017; Dolinsky and Soner, 2014), we do not require
the martingality of transport maps and we do not put additional constraints on them (Ekren and Soner,
2018).
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the finding that informed trading render options non redundant. However, it relies on severe
assumptions for an equilibrium to exist. The market maker’s belief about the underlying
asset is Gaussian (so that the price could be negative), it is limited to one at-the-money
call option. Furthermore, the price prior has to be distributed symmetrically around the
strike, and noise trading in the stock and the option must have a very specific anticorrelation
structure, though the author sketches possible ways of relaxing these two assumptions. Those
limitations mean the model cannot be used to address many open questions regarding the
impact of informed trading. For instance, one needs multiple options to properly study the
effect of asymmetric information on the implied volatility smile/smirk.
The complications when trying to extend the Back (1993) setup have constrained sub-
sequent studies. For instance, Collin-Dufresne, Fos, and Muravyev (2019) model the impact
(legal) informed trading by activists in a spot and options markets, but they have to rely on
the assumption that informed trading only occurs in the spot, and market makers auto-quote
options based on standard models. Yet, Kacperczyk and Pagnotta (2019) show that (illegal)
informed traders empirically do trade in both stock and options. A model able to handle
both scenarios (informed in the spot only vs. informed in the spot and the options) would
therefore be useful to understanding the findings in these studies. It would permit a deeper
investigation of the interplay of an underlying asset and its associated options markets. How
does price discovery happen in markets where both the asset and its derivatives (futures,
options, ...) are traded? How will liquidity in these markets be related, and what will be the
impact of informed trading on these quantities? How does the level of noise trading in each
market affect the choice of venue for informed traders?
As an application, we therefore show how to solve the Kyle-Back model when a stock is
traded together with multiple European options (calls, puts, or a combination), extending
the Back (1993) setup. We fully characterize the equilibrium and provide, in particular, the
cross-market impact matrix in quasi-closed form. We illustrate the methodology through
simulations with one, two, or three options, assuming that the prior belief for the underlying
is lognormally distributed. We show the distortion to the price of the options brought by
strategic trading, as compared to a Black-Scholes model with the same price distribution.
Interestingly, we show that the Black-Scholes volatility smile can emerge as a consequence
of asymmetric information concerns, based on the relative volumes of trading between the
spot and options and show how it can evolve through time until the information about the
fundamental value is released. Since all quantities (prices, trading and open interest volumes)
are available, the method can be used to address several questions treated empirically and
for which, sometimes, the empirical evidence is not clear cut.
Our work relates to recent efforts such as Pasquariello and Vega (2015); Garcia del Molino,
Mastromatteo, Benzaquen, and Bouchaud (2020) on multivariate Kyle models (without op-
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tions), which however fail to derive an equilibrium when price priors are not Gaussian. They
also rely on two-period settings rather than a multiperiod/continuous-time setting. This
forces any empirical analysis to calibrate a one-shot game repeatedly rather than dynami-
cally learning as long-lived information is revealed which would be better to ensure that all
information is incorporated into prices. Our methodology helps solve the multi asset prob-
lem in a dynamic setting and allowing for non-Gaussian distributions of the fundamental
beliefs hence permitting a comprehensive investigation of the impact of informed trading on
commonality.
Outside of the Kyle setting, related seminal frameworks with informed trading also in-
clude the Biais and Hillion (1994) and Easley, O’Hara, and Srinivas (1998) models, both
including options. The one-shot trading game of Rochet and Vila (1994) for a stock with
a non-Gaussian prior is also relevant. The recent paper by Kramkov and Xu (2019) tackles
a variant of the Rochet and Vila (1994) model, using tools from optimal transport. While
these two papers bear some resemblance to the discrete time setup of Kyle (1985), in those
two models, the informed trader observes the order flow of the noise. Unlike the discrete
time setup of Kramkov and Xu (2019), we use optimal transport theory to study the classi-
cal Kyle’s model in continuous time, relaxing many of its assumptions and extending it to
multiple assets and options. Overall, this paper nests and generalizes a number of existing
continuous-time Kyle-Back models. It is amenable to futher extensions, for instance to in-
clude stochastic noise as in Collin-Dufresne and Fos (2016), rather than the deterministic
(but possibly time-varying) process used in this paper.
We proceed as follows. In Section 2, we formally introduce the players and the trading
game, much along the line of Back (1992), but in a multidimensional setting with a general
prior for the true value of the assets. Then, in Section 3 we present our solution method and
prove that it is an equilibrium. Section 4 presents some applications ranging from general-
izing known results to previously intractable cases, both providing explicit solutions and an
efficient numerical approach. Section 5 concludes and presents avenues for further work.
2. Model
An informed trader has perfect information on the fundamental value of n traded assets at
a given horizon T . Interacting with noise traders, as well as the market maker, the objective
of the informed trader is to make the most profit from the information she holds. We first
describe the investment universe, the order flow of noise traders, then the rational choice
of the informed trader, and finally the pricing strategy of the market maker. We end this
section with the definition of an equilibrium. The model’s setup is in line with continuous-
time Kyle-Back models of informed trading.
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2. 1. Traded Assets
In the economy, n assets are available for trade for n ≥ 1 fixed. The n assets can be spot
assets (e.g., stocks) or derivatives with no early exercise feature (e.g., forwards, or European
options, including options that are not at-the-money). Full information on the fundamental
value of these assets, denoted v ∈ Rn, will be revealed at future time T . While the informed
trader knows this value already at time t = 0, the other players do not. The market maker
will have to filter this value from observing aggregate volumes. He views the true values
of the assets as random variables v˜ ∈ Rn and has a prior belief for the distribution of v˜,
denoted ν. Our general findings are derived under minimal assumptions on ν. Importantly,
ν does not have to be Gaussian, or absolutely continuous. This is a distinction from existing
multi-dimensional Kyle (1985) models, which are solved only for a relatively small number
of special distributional assumptions on ν. Relaxing the normality assumption is desirable
for stocks, given their limited liability feature. To guarantee that an equilibrium is reachable,
we make the following standing assumption:
Assumption 1. ν satisfies the moment condition2∫
Rn
|x|2+pν(dx) <∞ (2.1)
for some p > 0. We also assume that ν is not a point mass.
2. 2. Order Flow of Noise Traders
We assume that noise traders provide liquidity in the n assets according to dZt = σtdWt,
where σt is a deterministic but possibly time-varying square covariance matrix and W is a
standard n-dimensional Wiener process defined on a probability space (Ω,P). Following the
literature, we assume that W and v˜ are independent to guarantee that noise trading is an
uninformed trading. We denote by µ the distribution in Rn of
∫ T
0
σsdWs, which is Gaussian.
In other words, µ is the distribution of total noise trading from time 0 to the terminal date
T . Since σt is deterministic, the variance of noise trading up to the terminal date T is given
by the symmetric positive matrix of size n: Σ20 :=
∫ T
0
σ2sds. We make the additional standing
assumption:
Assumption 2. σ and σ−1 are continuous and bounded on [0, T ].
Note that, since W is a Brownian motion, we can write the variance of remaining noise
trading at t as Σ2t :=
∫ T
t
σ2sds.
2The moment condition is chosen for ease of presentation and is most likely not sharp.
5
2. 3. The Rational Choice of the Informed Trader
We start by specifying the information set of the informed trader, which is different from
that of the noise traders and the market maker. We assume that besides W and v˜, the
probability space (Ω,P) contains a random variable3 U ∈ Rn that is independent of v˜ and
W and distributed according to µ4. We denote by F = {Ft}t∈[0,T ] the augmented filtration
of the Markov process (1{t<0}U + 1{t=0}v˜ + 1{t∈(0,T ]}Wt)t∈[−1,∞). With this definition, F0 is
non-trivial since the informed trader knows v, the value at terminal date T of v˜ and also U ,
and in equilibrium F is strictly larger than the filtration of the market maker. The informed
trader is a risk-neutral agent who submits the order flow5 dXt ∈ Rn at each time t ∈ [0, T ).
At the last trading date T , the true value v is revealed to the market. Her cumulative trade
up to time t, Xt, is known only to her, i.e. the market maker cannot infer the informed trader
trade from observing total order flow.
The informed trader is not a price taker, i.e. her order will have a price impact. She
trades in an attempt to extract the most benefit from her private information, while still
allowing the market maker to quote a price. In addition to the n assets, the informed trader
can trade a locally risk free asset in zero net supply which return is assumed to be 0. The
initial wealth of the informed trader is set at 0 and any net long position at the outset of
the trading is financed by borrowing. Short selling is permitted. The only constraint on the
informed trader’s strategy aims at avoiding doubling strategies. This admissibility condition
is formally specified further down.
In the classical Kyle’s model, the informed trader observes only the quoted prices, and
it is assumed that in equilibrium the quoted prices are strictly increasing in the total order
flow. Thus, the informed agent can obtain Zt from the prices and his filtration F . In our case,
since there might be multiple options on a stock, there might be a redundant asset6, and it
might not be possible to obtain Z from the observation of the price process. Therefore, we
assume that the informed trader observes directly Y , and from this information she computes
Z (as in Back, 1993). Thus, we assume that the information of the informed agent at time
t is Ft.
Denoting Pt ∈ Rn the prices quoted by the market maker, the objective of the informed
trader is to maximise her total gains from trading which are
∫ T
0
X>t dPt + (v − PT )>XT .
Applying Ito’s lemma to (v−Pt)>Xt, the informed trader’s objective function can be written
3The random variable U is only needed for randomization purposes when the distribution v˜ is not
absolutely continuous. When the distribution of v˜ is absolutely continuous our construction of the equilibrium
does not need this random variable.
4U could have any absolutely continuous distribution on Rn.
5For ease of presentation, we assume that X is a continuous semimartingale. This assumption can be
relaxed as in Back (1992).
6In the sense of static, not dynamic replication.
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as follows:
sup
X
E
[∫ T
0
(v − Pt)>dXt −
n∑
i=1
〈X i, P i〉T
]
. (2.2)
where 〈X i, P i〉T is the integrated quadratic variation between X and P up to time T and X
is a strategy in the sense of Definition 2 below.
2. 4. The Market Maker’s Problem
The economy has a risk-neutral continuum of market makers (“the market maker”) compet-
ing for order flow and quoting at each time t a price Pt. At the final time T , the private
information is revealed, and the price will reach PT = v, possibly with a jump if all informa-
tion has not been incorporated In equilibrium there will be no jump but the insider optimizes
amongst strategies allowing for jumps although we show that no such strategy is optimal.
The market maker observes the total order flow Y , from which she is unable to disentangle
informed and noise traders order flow. Denoting the total order flow from time 0 to time t
by Yt, its dynamics writes as:
dYt = dXt + σtdWt (2.3)
The market maker quotes prices while facing two sources of uncertainty: the terminal
value of the traded assets and the order flow. Being risk neutral, rational pricing by the
market maker commands the following pricing rule:
Pt = E[v˜|FYt ] (2.4)
where FYt is the filtration associated with Y assuming FY0 is trivial. Given that the informed
trader does know the terminal value of the traded assets, the market maker filtration satisfies
FY ⊂ F .
2. 5. Equilibrium
The goal is to determine an equilibrium in the game between the informed trader and the
market marker, and to simultaneously price the assets. The only source of information for
the market maker is the order flow. As such, quoted prices will be adapted to FY and such
that, given Yt, the market maker quotes prices such that:
Pt = H(t, Yt). (2.5)
where H is a suitably chosen functional of t and Y . We require that this pricing rule H
satisfies the following properties:
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Definition 1. A pricing rule is a measurable map H : {(0, 0)} ∪ (0, T ]×Rn 7→ Rn which is
• continuously differentiable in t and twice continuously differentiable in y on (0, T )×Rn,
• satisfies the integrability assumption
E[|H(T, ZT )|2] +
∫ T
0
E[|H(t, Zt)|2]dt <∞. (2.6)
Condition (2.6) insures that the local martingales we manipulate are martingales, and
that we have explicit formulas for expected returns gains. Since we only require it to be
defined on a strict subset of [0, T ]×Rn, our class of pricing rules is larger than its counterpart
in Back (1992). With the generality we are targeting for ν, we are not able to prove that the
equilibrium pricing rule we construct can be extended to [0, T ] × Rn. Although we expect
that such an extension is possible for particular examples, this point is in fact not needed to
establish an equilibrium.
We turn now to define the admissible strategies by the informed trader:
Definition 2. A trading strategy for the informed trader is a continuous square integrable
semi-martingale X adapted to F satisfying∫ T
0
E[|H(t,Xt + Zt)|2]dt <∞ (2.7)
for all pricing rule H.
Similarly to the boundedness condition based on the market maker information flow, we
also guarantee that informed trader activity will stay reasonable in that it will not generate
erratic prices.
We are now well equipped to set up the definition of the equilibrium:
Definition 3. We say that a pricing rule H∗ and a trading strategy X∗ for the informed
trader is an equilibrium if
• H∗(t, Yt) = E[v˜|FYt ] whenever Yt = X∗t + Zt,
• X∗ is maximizer of
sup
X
E
[∫ T
0
(v −H∗(t,Xt + Zt))>dXt −
n∑
i=1
〈X i· , H∗,i(·, X· + Z·)〉T
]
(2.8)
among all trading strategies X.
We are now set up to solve for the equilibrium. We omit in the following the superscript
in X∗, H∗ when there is no confusion in the notation.
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3. A General Solution Method
In order to construct our candidate equilibrium strategy, we will use results from optimal
transport theory. We start by elaborating on the relationship between the informed trading
problem and optimal transport, before recalling the main theorems and then their application
in our setting.
3. 1. Intuition
The distribution of noise trading is common knowledge in the economy. Interaction of the
market maker with only noise traders will never guarantee that at the final date T , the pricing
by the market maker will be such that H(T, ZT ) = PT = v˜. Additionally, in equilibrium,
the market maker cannot observe nor predict the future order flow of the informed trader
and sees the distribution of the total order flow process YT = XT +ZT as the distribution of
ZT . In equilibrium, the informed trader’s strategy is that the order flow she submits to the
market maker guarantees that H(T,XT +ZT ) = PT = v˜. Hence, the informed trader strategy
should be such that the market maker, while knowing that the distribution of noise trading
ZT over the period is µ, should set up a pricing rule H(t, Yt) such that the distribution of
H(T, YT ) is exactly the distribution ν of the fundamental value. Therefore, we will construct
a candidate equilibrium where we postulate the pricing rule of the market maker at final
time x 7→ H(T, x) to be the unique optimal transport map (to be defined precisely below)
from µ to ν. The candidate equilibrium strategy of the informed trader will be to map back7
the distribution ν of v˜ onto the distribution µ of ZT , and force the total order flow to match
this random variable at final time.
After providing some preliminaries on optimal transport theory, we fully define our can-
didate strategies.
3. 2. Main Theorems from Transport Theory
For two probability measures α and β on Rn with α absolutely continuous with respect to
the Lebesgue measure and a Borel measurable map M : Rn 7→ Rn, we denote by M]α the
push-forward measure of the measure α by the mapping M which is defined as M]α(A) =
α(M−1(A)) for all Borel measurable set A ⊂ Rn. We say that M pushes α forward to β if
the equality of measures M]α = β holds.
7In the case ν is not absolutely continuous, this is essentially only possible thanks to an additional
randomization via U .
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We recall in the Appendix A some concepts related to the optimal transport theory
and state the Brenier’s Theorem. Using these results, we prove the following Corollary that
summarizes the optimal transport results needed to construct the candidate equilibrium:
Corollary 1 (A Corollary to Brenier’s theorem). There exists a unique convex function
Γ : Rn → R such that ∇Γ(ZT ) is distributed according to ν and E[Γ(ZT )] = 0.
Additionally, in the probability space (Ω,P) there exists a random variable ζ satisfying8
∇Γ(ζ) = v˜, and ζ has distribution µ. (3.1)
If ν is absolutely continuous, then ∇Γ is invertible (on the support of ν) and one can take
ζ = (∇Γ)−1(v˜). (3.2)
Proof. The proof is provided in Appendix A.1.
The function Γ is called the Brenier’s potential and the function∇Γ is called the Brenier’s
map. In the optimal transport theory Brenier’s potential is always defined up an additive
constant. Thus, up to integrability of Γ(ZT ) that we prove in this corollary, we can choose
the additive constant to require E[Γ(ZT )] = 0. This choice of the additive constant is made
to simplify the expression for the expected gain of the informed trader in equilibrium that
we provide below.
We are fully equipped to derive the equilibrium in our economy with asymmetry of
information.
3. 3. Solving the Informed Trader Problem
Due to the definition of equilibrium, H(t, Yt) must be a martingale. A convenient way of
defining our equilibrium pricing rule H is via the stochastic representation
H(t, y) := E
[
∇Γ
(
y +
∫ T
t
σsdWs
)]
for (t, y) ∈ {(0, 0)} ∪ (0, T ]× Rn (3.3)
where ∇Γ(·) is the optimal transport map constructed in Corollary 1 which pushes forward
µ to ν.
With a slight abuse of notation, we also define the function Γ : {(0, 0)}∪ (0, T ]×Rn 7→ R
by
Γ(t, y) := E
[
Γ
(
y +
∫ T
t
σsdWs
)]
. (3.4)
We now provide properties of (3.3) and (3.4).
8As mentioned, we only use U to construct ζ when ν is not absolutely continuous.
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Lemma 1. The function H defined by (3.3) is a pricing rules and, for all i = 1, . . . n, H i is
the solution of the PDE
∂tH
i + Tr
(
σ2t
2
∂2yyH
i
)
= 0, for all (t, y) ∈ (0, T )× Rn (3.5)
with final condition H i(T, y) = ∂xiΓ(y) for y ∈ Rn. Additionally, Γ(t, y) defined via (3.4)
satisfies:
• Γ(t, y) is a continuous function on {(0, 0)}∪ (0, T ]×Rn and continuously differentiable
in t and twice continuously differentiable in y on (0, T )× Rn,
• for all (t, y) ∈ (0, T ]× Rn, we have
∇Γ(t, y) = H(t, y). (3.6)
By definition, ∇Γ
(∫ T
0
σsdWs
)
is distributed as ν and has good integrability properties.
However, it is not clear if this is also the case for ∇Γ
(
y +
∫ T
0
σsdWs
)
for some y 6= 0. To
have such a result, one needs to obtain bounds on the growth of ∇Γ at infinity. Such bounds
in fact exists for a fairly large class of ν as shown by Caffarelli (1990, 1991). However, for
the case of interest such as stocks and options on the stock, ν is a singular measure and we
are not able to use the results available in the literature. Therefore, we have chosen to only
define pricing rules on {(0, 0)} ∪ (0, T ]× Rn where the moments of ν allow the definition of
H. Whether H can be extended to [0, T ]× Rn is out of the scope of this paper.
Given this property of the pricing function H, we can state the following:
Lemma 2. The Jacobian matrix ∇yH(t, y) = {∂yjH i(t, y)}i,j=1,...n = {∂2yiyjΓ(t, y)}i,j=1,...n is
a symmetric positive semidefinite matrix for t ∈ (0, T ), and for any trading strategy X, we
have
E
[∫ T
0
(v −H(t, Yt))>dXt −
n∑
i=1
〈X i, H i(·, Y·)〉T
]
= E
[
v>YT − Γ(YT )− 1
2
n∑
i,j=1
∫ T
0
n∑
i,j=1
∂2yiyjΓ(t, Yt)d〈X i, Xj〉t
]
. (3.7)
Proof. See Appendix B.1.
The representation (3.7) directly links the informed trader’s objective function to the
optimal transport map. Now define the convex conjugate Γ∗ of Γ as follows:
Γ∗(v) = sup
y∈Rn
{v>y − Γ(y)}. (3.8)
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A complete characterization of the informed trader’s optimal strategy is given in the
following proposition.
Proposition 1. If the market maker uses the pricing rule (3.6) then the criterion of the
informed trader (2.8) is a concave problem. For all realizations v of v˜, the wealth of the
informed trader at the optimum is:
max
X
E
[∫ T
0
(v −H(t, Yt))>dXt −
n∑
i=1
〈X i, H i(·, Y·)〉T
]
= Γ∗(v). (3.9)
Any absolutely continuous trading strategy X of the informed trader insuring PT = v˜ is
optimal. In particular,
dXt = σ
2
t (Σ
2
t )
−1(ζ − Yt)dt (3.10)
is optimal where ζ ∈ Rn is the total volume target, constructed as in (3.1).
Proof. See Appendix B.1.
The informed trader optimal strategy Xt is absolutely continuous which is a generaliza-
tion of many of the previous findings in the literature which have to assume a particular
distribution for the common belief about the fundamental values. We can then write the
dynamics of the total order flow to the market maker as:
dYt = σ
2
t (Σ
2
t )
−1(ζ − Yt)dt+ σtdWt (3.11)
which satisfies YT = ζ and therefore H(T, YT ) = ∇Γ(YT ) = ∇Γ(ζ) = v˜.
The construction of the total target volume ζ only requires the use of U if ν is not abso-
lutely continuous. If ν is absolutely continuous, then ζ has the more natural representation
(3.2) which can also be written as
ζ = (∇Γ)−1(v˜) = ∇Γ∗(v˜).
Due to the use of U for its construction, our equilibrium is superficially different from
the one in Back (1993). However, they actually coincide (at least distributionally) under the
more restrictive Back (1993) assumptions. Indeed, both our Proposition 1 and Back (1993,
Lemma 1) state that any (absolutely continuous) strategy allowing PT = v˜ is optimal for
the informed agent. In Back (1993, Lemma 2), such a strategy is explicitly constructed by
controlling Yt via a drift term (1 − t)−1E[ZT |Zt = y, PT = v˜]. This strategy insures that,
conditional on the filtration of the market maker, the distribution of YT is the same as the
distribution of ZT . This property is what is needed to show that we have an equilibrium
strategy. In our case, because the set of y for which we have ∇Γ(y) = v˜ is no longer always
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a straight line, there are no results in the literature to help conjecture a strategy for the
informed agent. Therefore, we are introducing the additional random variable U in the case
where ν is not absolutely continuous. It serves to construct a target volume ζ as in (3.1).
Then, the informed agent trades to control Y to insure YT = ζ, so that YT has distribution
µ, similar to Back (1993, Lemma 2). Finally, although in terms of realizations of the random
variables, our equilibrium might be different from the one in Back (1993, Lemma 2), in fact
both equilibria share the same distributional properties, and our construction in (3.10) is
arguably more intuitive.
One of the main reasons why the optimal transport theory fundamentally simplifies the
understanding of the classical Kyle-Back models is the equality (3.9). Indeed, this identity
easily identifies the expected wealth of the informed trader with the convex conjugate of the
Brenier’s potential.
The second important link between these concepts relies on the so-called dual formulation
of the optimal transport problem. Indeed, we observe that, for all y ∈ Rn and v in the support
of ν, the functions Γ and Γ∗ satisfy
Γ(y) + Γ∗(v) ≥ y>v (3.12)
and (at least when Γ∗ is differentiable)
Γ(∇Γ∗(v)) + Γ∗(v) = (∇Γ∗(v))>v. (3.13)
Thus, if we define on {(0, 0)} × Rn ∪ (0, T ]× Rn × Rn, the function J by
J(t, y, v) = Γ∗(v) + Γ(t, y)− v>y,
we obtain
J(T, y, v) = Γ∗(v) + Γ(y)− v>y ≥ 0 = Γ(∇Γ∗(v)) + Γ∗(v)− (∇Γ∗(v))>v = J(T,∇Γ∗(v), v).
Additionally, an analysis of our proof shows that the expected welfare of the informed
trader from trading on [t, T ] is
max
X
E
[∫ T
t
(v −H(s, Ys))>dXs −
n∑
i=1
〈X i, H i(·, Y·)〉T − 〈X i, H i(·, Y·)〉t|Ft
]
= J(t, Yt, v).
One can directly check that the function J solves the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation
max
θ∈Rn
{
∂tJ + θ
>∂yJ +
1
2
Tr
(
σtσ
>
t ∂
2
yyJ
)
+ θ>(v −H)
}
= 0. (3.14)
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Thus, the function J is the value function defined in Back (1992, Theorem 2).
In fact, via the inequality (3.12) and (3.13), the functions Γ and Γ∗ identify the final
condition of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation (3.14). The main contribution of the
present work is to fully identify this final condition via the Brenier’s map and its convex
conjugate. Indeed, although the equation (3.14) was known in the literature, the statement
of Kyle-Back model does not specify a final condition and dynamic programming principle
type approaches such as (3.14) were only able to handle Kyle-Back models in specific cases.
3. 4. Solving the Market Maker’s Problem
Having characterized the optimal strategy of the informed trader, we turn now to the pricing
rule used by the market maker at equilibrium which is given in the following:
Proposition 2. If the informed trader uses the strategy (3.11), then, conditionally on FYt ,
ζ is distributed as a Gaussian random variable with mean Yt and covariance matrix Σ2t and
(H(t, Yt))t∈[0,T ] is a FY martingale with final value v and therefore H(t, Yt) = E[v˜|FYt ].
Proof. See Appendix B.2.
The following theorem is the main theoretical contributions of this paper.
Theorem 1 (Existence of Equilibrium). The couple of strategies yielding total flow (3.11)
and pricing function (3.3) is an equilibrium for the generalized Kyle – Back’s model.
Proof. The proof is a direct consequence of Propositions 1-2.
Evolution of the market maker’s belief. The Proposition 2 also provides the evolution
of the belief of the market maker. Indeed, in equilibrium, the final price will satisfy PT =
∇Γ(YT ) and conditional to FYt , the information of the market maker at time t, YT is Gaussian
with mean Yt and covariance Σ2t . Therefore, conditional to FYt , v˜ has the same distribution
as ∇Γ(Yt +ZT −Zt). Once the transport map ∇Γ is computed, one can easily compute the
distribution of v˜ conditional to FYt .
Price impact and market depth. The price impact matrix is {∂2yiyjΓ(t, y)}i,j=1,...n, which
is symmetric positive semi-definite. Additionally, by a differentiation of (3.4), the matrix val-
ued process {∂2yiyjΓ(t, Zt)}i,j=1,...n is a martingale. If it is invertible, taking its inverse, which
is a convex operation on symmetric positive matrices, the market depth is a submartingale.
Overall, we cannot guarantee at this level of generality that the price impact matrix will be
invertible and hence that it is sufficient to have non-singular noise trading processes to have
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make derivatives, for example, non redundant.
3. 5. Computing the Transport Map
Given the equilibrium characterized above, the main difficulty is then to find the transport
map that links the multivariate distribution of the noise to the multivariate distribution of
the payoffs. In some cases, the transport map may be written explicitly. This is for instance
the case for any one-dimensional case, and in some specific cases such as the ones considered
by Back (1992) and Back (1993). Note that the geometric construction of the solution in Back
(1993) has a direct interpretation in terms of a transport map. We explain that connection
and generalize it in Subsection 4.4. In general, explicit solutions to the transport problem
are currently known for a certain class of multivariate Gaussian and elliptical distribution
(Ghaffari and Walker, 2018).
Thankfully, in cases where an explicit transport map is not known, some very efficient
algorithms make it possible to compute it numerically. For instance, the Sinkhorn algorithm
is a popular choice for calculating a transport map (Cuturi, 2013). This algorithm is fast,
parallelizable, and well-suited for GPU computation.
To summarize, when there is no explicit formula for the transport, the following steps
have to be followed to generate prices as quoted by the market maker:
1. Parametrize a prior distribution for the price of the assets, and a distribution for the
noise;
2. Decide on a space discretization for the two distributions;
3. Compute a distance matrix between each point of the two space discretizations;
4. Run the Sinkhorn (or an alternative) algorithm to find the optimal transport map
between the two distributions;
5. Compute the asset prices for a given level of order flow by numerically integrating the
noise distribution against the transport map (analog to Equation 3.3).
In the next section, we describe some examples ranging from the simple one-asset case
(already well-known) to more complex scenarios, including one asset with multiple options
(not previously solved). We describe some parametrizations for the numerical approach, and
the explicit constructions of the transport maps.
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4. Applications
In this section, we analyze several applications of the general method outlined above. Beside
the one-asset case, which is well-studied for normal and lognormal assumptions on the prior
belief about the terminal value of the assets, we offer a solution to the multi-asset Gaussian
and lognormal prior cases. We then generalize the Back (1993) case of one underlying and
one call, and extend it to one underlying, one call and one put. These few applications, by
no means exhaustive, are meant to demonstrate the flexibility of our method.
4. 1. Single Asset
The one-asset model put forth in the seminal contribution of Kyle (1985) is widespread in
the literature on informed trading and equilibrium. Our approach applies straightforwardly
in this case. In dimension n = 1, there exists a unique increasing function pushing µ on to ν.
Denoting Fµ and Fν the cumulative distribution functions of µ and ν, this function is given
by x 7→ F−1ν (Fµ(x)). Therefore, Γ is the only antiderivative of this function satisfying the
condition E[Γ(ZT )] = 0. The construction of the pricing rule in Back (1992, Theorem 1) can
in fact be explained via our method, which provides an intuition through optimal transport:
the pricing rule at final time is the unique monotone transport map for one-dimensional
distributions.
4. 2. Multidimensional Gaussian Prior
Assume now that the market maker and the noise trader beliefs are such that v˜ ∼ ν =
N(mv,ΣvΣ
>
v ) where mv ∈ Rn and Σv is a n× n symmetric positive definite matrix. In this
case, the function Γ is given by:
Γ(x) =
1
2
x>Σv(ΣvΣ20Σv)
−1/2Σvx+m>v x
and the optimal transport mapping will be:
∇Γ(x) = Σv(ΣvΣ20Σv)−1/2Σvx+mv
as elicited in Ghaffari and Walker (2018).
One can thus deduce the pricing rule which is:
Pt = Σv(ΣvΣ
2
0Σv)
−1/2ΣvYt +mv.
This is a generalization of Pasquariello and Vega (2015) and Garcia del Molino et al. (2020)
in a continuous-time setting.
Note that the fact that σt is time-dependent does not make Kyle’s λ time-dependent; it
is still the constant matrix Σv(ΣvΣ20Σv)−1/2Σv in our case.
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4. 3. Multidimensional Lognormal Prior
For n = 1, assuming log(v˜) ∼ N(mv, σ2v) for some mv ∈ R and σv > 0, ∇Γ can be explicitly
computed as in Subsection 4.1. The explicit solution is:
∇Γ(x) = exp
(
mv +
σv√
Σ20
x
)
. (4.1)
By the Feymann-Kac formula (3.3) we obtain that
Pt = exp
(
mv +
σv√
Σ20
Yt +
σ2v
2Σ20
Σ2t
)
.
Additionally, we can explicitly compute the price impact by noting that:
dPt = ∂yH(t, Yt)dYt =
σv√
Σ20
PtdYt
which shows that the Kyle’s lambda is proportional to the price. These findings are similar
to those already reported by Back (1992, Example 2).
In the multidimensional case n ≥ 2, one assumes that log(v˜) ∼ N(mv,Σ2v) for some mv ∈
Rn and Σv a n × n symmetric and positively definite matrix. In such a case also, Brenier’s
theorem shows that ∇Γ exists, and thanks to our main Theorem 1, we are guaranteed of
the existence of an equilibrium. Closed form expressions for ∇Γ are not available in the
literature for all distributions. However, the function ∇Γ can be numerically computed via
the methods mentioned in Subsection 3.5. This case is easy to simulate, but for concision we
reserve the simulations to the next cases, which are of more interest.
An interesting open question is whether, in the multidimensional case, the mapping ∇Γ
admits some exponential factorisation such as (4.1) in the one-dimensional case. This would
allow us to explicitly obtain the price impact as a function of the price process. We leave
this question for future research.
4. 4. Case of a Stock and a Call Option
In this subsection, we show how our methodology allows us to solve a general version of
the problem studied by Back (1993). We assume that there are two assets in the market: a
stock and a European call option on the stock with strike K maturing at time T , which is
the instant the fundamental value of the stock will be revealed. We denote by νS the prior
belief at time 0 for the stock value at T , and FνS the Cumulative Distribution Function
(CDF) of this distribution. Given that the second asset is a call option on the stock, the
joint distribution ν of the terminal values of the stock and the call option at time T , denoted
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(v˜S, v˜C), is a singular distribution on R2 supported on the graph of the payoff function
x 7→ (x−K)+, i.e.
ν(dvS, dvC) = δ(vS−K)+(dv
C)νS(dvS)
where δ is the Dirac mass.
Additionally, µ, the distribution of the noise (ZST , ZCT ), is a Gaussian distribution whose
Probability Density Function (PDF) for x ∈ R2 is
p(x) =
1
2pi
√
det Σ20
e−
1
2
x>(Σ20)
−1x (4.2)
We allow, in particular, the two noise trading volumes to be arbitrarily correlated. Our
main Theorem 1 applies in this framework and the optimal transport map ∇Γ : R2 7→ R2
from µ to ν provides an equilibrium pricing rule.
The computation of the map can be done via the methods mentioned in Subsection 3.5.
Figure 1 and 2 show two sample paths, one finishing in the money, the other out of the money.
We make the following assumptions for our simulations. The belief about the terminal value
of the underlying is one of a lognormal distribution with mean 100 and return volatility 20%.
For the noise trading process, we assume that it follows a multivariate Gaussian distribution
with mean 0 and variance 4 for each asset (i.e., the underlying and the call option). The
covariance between the volumes is set to −2 to match the restriction from Back (1993)
that it be −0.5 of the noise in the call option. Of course, our method does not require this
assumption; our purpose is to deviate from the Back (1993) case only by changing the prior
from normal to lognormal, for which that paper was not able to obtain a solution. The strike
price is K = 100. Comparing the option price coming out of the model versus Black-Scholes,
we see that the two prices track each other quite closely but converge more rapidly for the
case when the price ends up in the money.
[Figure 1 about here.]
[Figure 2 about here.]
[Figure 3 about here.]
Beside these computational methods, in this particular case, it is in fact possible to
describe the transport map based on an ordinary differential equation, generalizing the case
of Back (1993). For this purpose, we conjecture, then prove that there exists a function from
R to R with a derivative less than −1, so that under and above this graph ∇Γ is a “simple”
one-dimensional projection, described below.
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Define the functions p2, p3 and p4 by
p2 : (y
S, yC) ∈ R2 7→
∫ yC
−∞
p(yS, y)dy
p3 : (y
S, yC) ∈ R2 7→
∫ ∞
yS
p(y, yS + yC − y)dy
p4 : (y
S, yC) ∈ R2 7→
∫ ∞
yS
p2(y, y
C − y)dy.
(4.3)
(4.4)
(4.5)
We also define the ODE for x ∈ R A
′(x)= p2(x,B(x))
B′(x)= −1 + F
−1
νS
(A(x))−K
F−1
νS
(p4(x,x+B(x))+A(x))−K
(4.6)
where the unknown functions is the couple (A,B). This ODE is in fact ill-posed since the
denominator might become small. The constants of integration of the ODE are determined
by the condition
lim
x→−∞
A(x) = 0, and lim
x→+∞
A(x) = P
(
ZCT ≤ B
(
ZST
))
= qK (4.7)
where qK = F−1νS (K) is the probability that the option will be out of the money at maturity
and F−1
νS
is the quantile function of νS.We provide below assumptions on νS to find solutions
to the ODE satisfying this condition. Assuming this existence, we now provide an explicit
construction of the transport map ∇Γ. For this purpose, denote
pl(c) = P
(
ZCT ≤ B
(
ZST
)
and ZST ≤ c
)
pr(c) = 1− P
(
ZCT ≥ B
(
ZST
)
and ZST + Z
C
T ≥ c
)
fl(x) = F
−1
νS
(pl(x))) and fr(x) = F−1νS (pr(x)) .
(4.8)
(4.9)
(4.10)
By direct computation, we have
pr(x+B(x)) = p4(x, x+B(x)) + A(x) for all x ∈ R (4.11)
and B solves
B′(x) = −1 + fl(x)−K
fr(x+B(x))−K for all x ∈ R (4.12)
and satisfies B′ < −1.
Both functions fl and fr are increasing and fl(x) ↑ K as x ↑ ∞ whereas fr(x) ↓ K
as x ↓ −∞. The following proposition provides the construction (up to computation of B
above) of the pricing rule:
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Proposition 3. The function Γ : R2 7→ R defined by
Γ(yS, yC) =

∫ yS
0
fl(y)dy if yC ≤ B(yS)∫ yS+yC
B(0)
fr(y)dy −K(yC −B(0)) if yC > B(yS)
(4.13)
is convex on R2 and ∇Γ(ZST , ZCT ) is distributed as ν. Therefore, up to an additive constant,
Γ is the map in Theorem 2 and the pricing rule at final time ∇Γ has the expression
∇Γ(yS, yC) =

fl(yS)
0
 if yC ≤ B(yS) fr(yS + yC)
fr(y
S + yC)−K
 if yC > B(yS). (4.14)
Proof. See Appendix B.3.
Proposition 3 allows us to fully compute an equilibrium and exhibits an important
partition of the space in two regions {yC ≤ B(yS)}, called “out of the volume” (OTV),
and {yC > B(yS)}, called “in the volume” (ITV). We denote these regions as follows:
1OTV = 1{yC≤B(yS)} and 1ITV = 1{yC>B(yS)}.
Thanks to our main theorem, Theorem 1, we have the following representation of the
pricing rule for t ∈ [0, T ]:
H(t, y) =E
[
∇Γ
(
y +
∫ T
t
σsdWs
)]
=
E [1OTVfl (yS + ZST − ZSt )+ 1ITVfr (yS + ZST − ZSt + yC + ZCT − ZCt )]
E
[
1ITV
(
fr
(
yS + ZST − ZSt + yC + ZCT − ZCt
)−K)]

and the price impact matrix λ(t, y) is given by
[
∂y1H(t, y), ∂y2H(t, y)
]
, where the compo-
nents are the vectors
∂ySH(t, y) =
E [1OTVf ′l (yS + ZST − ZSt )+ 1ITVf ′r (yS + ZST − ZSt + yC + ZCT − ZCt )]
E
[
1ITVf
′
r
(
yS + ZST − ZSt + yC + ZCT − ZCt
)]

+
∫∞−∞B′(yS + z)p(t, y, B(yS + z)− yC)(fl(yS + z)− fr(yS + z +B(yS + z)))dz∫∞
−∞B
′(yS + z)p(t, z, B(yS + z)− yC)(K − fr(yS + z +B(yS + z)))dz

and
∂yCH(t, y) =E
[
1ITVf
′
r
(
yS + ZST − ZSt + yC + ZCT − ZCt
)]1
1

+
∫∞−∞ p(t, z, B(yS + z)− yC)(fr(yS + z +B(yS + z))− fl(yS + z))dz∫∞
−∞ p(t, z, B(y
S + z)− yC)(fr(yS + z +B(yS + z))−K)dz

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where p(t, yS, yC) is the probability density function of
∫ T
t
σsdWs.
We now provide a lemma that yields to existence of solutions to (4.6).
Lemma 3. Assume that there exists ε > 0 so that νS only charges points on [−1
ε
, K − ε] ∪
[K + ε, 1
ε
] and F−1
νS
is C1 with bounded derivatives on [0, qK) ∪ (qK , 1]. Then, there exists a
solution (A,B) to (4.6) satisfying (4.7).
Proof. See Appendix B.1.
The lemma mainly means that νS does not charge any mass near the strike of the option
which allows us to have existence of solutions to (4.6).
Note that a natural way of obtaining solutions for a general νS would be to approximate
its quantile function F−1
νS
by quantile functions satisfying the assumptions of Lemma 3, then
to show that the solutions of the equation with approximated quantile function converge.
However, proving such a convergence seems to be challenging and is left for future research.
An example of solution for (4.6) is provided in Back (1993). Assume that (Σ20)1,2 =
− (Σ20)2,2
2
and FνS is symmetric around K, then a computation shows that B(x) = −2x solves
the ODE (4.6). Indeed, we can directly compute p2(x,−2x) and p4(x,−x)+
∫ x
−∞ p2(s,−2s)ds
and show that p4(x,−x) +
∫ x
−∞ p2(s,−2s)ds − 12 = 12 −
∫ x
−∞ p2(s,−2s)ds. Additionally the
symmetry of FνS around K implies that qK = 12 and
F−1
νS
(∫ x
−∞ p2(s,−2s)ds
)
−K
F−1
νS
(
p4(x,−x) +
∫ x
−∞ p2(s,−2s)ds
)
−K
= −1.
Thus, B(x) = −2x solves (4.6) and one can compute fr, fl to obtain an expression for ∇Γ.
Note that we are in fact generalizing the results of Back (1993) since we only require the
symmetry of FνS around K and not its normality. However, we emphasize that our optimal
transport based approach does not need the solvability of this ODE which only indicates
an additional property of the transport map. The optimal transport map and therefore the
equilibrium exist via the Brenier’s theorem.
4. 5. Case of a Stock, a Call and a Put
In this subsection, we assume that there are three traded assets: a stock, as well as European
call and put options on the asset with the same maturity T and strike K9.
Note that at the final time the prices of call option, put option and the stock (in this
order) take value on the set
Uprice ∪ Lprice
9Our approach does not require that the call and put share the same strike – we do in order to discuss
put-call parity implications.
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where Uprice := {(s −K, 0, s) : s ≥ K} and Lprice := {(0, K − s, s) : s ≤ K}. We are given
the distribution νS of the stock at maturity, and denote FνS its CDF.
We conjecture that the transport map can actually be derived explicitly. However, we
once again show some numerical computation results first, for a lognormal prior on the
spot price. Figure 4 shows a sample path based on the parametrization used in the previous
subsection, but this time with both a call and a put on top of the spot asset. The price of the
options quoted by the market maker (in blue) tracks the Black-Scholes price (in green) with
a time-varying spread which is sometimes negative and sometimes positive, likely related to
the relative intensity of the noise levels.
[Figure 4 about here.]
Parity implications. Since ∇Γ takes values in Uprice ∪Lprice the derivatives of Γ satisfy
the equality
∂ySΓ(y
C, yP, yS) + ∂yPΓ(y
C, yP, yS) = K + ∂yCΓ(y
C, yP, yS).
Thus, taking the conditional expectatio, for all (t, yC, yP, yS) ∈ {(0, 0, 0, 0)} ∪ (0, T )×R3 we
have
HS(t, yC, yP, yS) +HP(t, yC, yP, yS) = K +HC(t, yC, yP, yS) (4.15)
which is the classic put-call parity. We can now differentiate (4.15) to obtain identities
between various entries of the price impact matrix that holds at any time and order flow.
4. 6. Black-Scholes Implied Volatility Smile with Three Options
In this subsection, we consider the case where there are one asset and three European options
of the same type (e.g. puts) trading at different strikes. This allows us to take a closer look
at the option pricing implications of the model. In particular, we can compute Black-Scholes
implied volatility (IV) for the three strikes. It is obvious since Back (1993) that Black-Scholes
dynamics do not apply when adding an option to the single-asset model of Back (1992): even
if the prior about the fundamental value if lognormally distributed, the stock’s price will not
be lognormally distributed. However, IV is often used as an alternative measure of option
price. Further, the empirical fact of the IV “smile” or “smirk” (created from different IVs at
different strikes) has been one motivation behind the development of alternatives to Black-
Scholes. To our knowledge, however, there has been no theory of how asymmetric information
may lead to an IV smile. We show here that variation in the relative order flow for different
options and the stock can create that link.
[Figure 5 about here.]
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Figure 5 shows the implied volatility curvature based on three simulations of 1,000 Brow-
nian trajectories for order flows. They include a spot asset and three put options with strikes
70, 100 and 130. The market maker’s prior for the final asset price is assumed to be lognor-
mal with mean 100 and volatility 20%. At each step of the trajectory, we compute the price
of the spot asset and the three options, then we obtain the Black-Scholes IV for each option
given the spot price. The curvature is then computed as (IV70 +IV130−2×IV100)/(130−70).
A positive curvature indicates a smile, while a negative one indicates a frown.
First, it is noticeable that different paths can result both in smiles and frowns. The
standard deviation of the curvature increases as time passes (as shown by the outer bounds
of the crossbar). Because order flows are drawn from a multivariate Gaussian with mean
zero, on average cumulative volumes will stay at zero. However, as time passes, it becomes
more likely that some trajectories will go further away from zero. All things being equal,
if one asset’s order flow becomes larger relative to others, its price will be pushed up, and
so will its implied volatility. This, in turn controls the shape of the IV curvature. While
the average curvature hovers around zero, it appears to increase at the very end, when it
becomes clear which options will end up in the money. Individual paths for the curvature,
however, can vary, and even revert.
Second, comparing Scheme 1 in Panel A, where the noise covariance is the identity, and
Scheme 2 in Panel B, where it is the identity times four, the patterns are almost exactly
the same. Scaling the variance of the order flow does not appear to affect the IV curvature
distribution. Scheme 3, in Panel C, has the variance of the spot asset volume at four times
that of the options. While the overall patterns are similar, the curvatures appear to be
slightly more concentrated around their means throughout, although less so towards the
end.
[Figure 6 about here.]
Figure 6 presents a similar setup but keeps the noise covariance as an identity matrix.
Instead, each panel present different combination of strikes. Panel A is the same as in Fig-
ure 5, with puts at 70, 100 and 130. Panel B shows strikes 95, 100 and 105. Panel C shows
strikes 70, 100 and 105.
Compared to Panel A, the average curvature in Panel B – with more concentrated strikes
– appears to diminish into negative territory after time 0.5, before coming back up in the
last few stews. With more concentrated strikes, there is more likelihood for a longer period
of time that some out-of-the-money option ends up in the money, or vice versa. Panel C,
with its asymetric strikes, appears to have a similar pattern as Panel A for the average, but
the dispersion is higher. The standard deviations for all panels, however, are very large, so
that there are limits to how we can visually interpret the average curvature pattern.
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[Table I about here.]
To better understand the drivers of the curvature, we therefore turn to some panel re-
gressions, based on the same simulations as before. Table I uses the IVs and curvatures from
Panel A in Figures 5 and 6. We look at how the flow on each of the spot and the three put
options impacts each of the option’s IV, and the IV curvature (here multiplied by 105 for
legibility).
All IVs have an intercept which is relatively close to 20%, which is the volatility of the
prior. Looking at the IV for the put at 70, it is driven positively by its own volumes, as well
as volumes on the spot and the 100 put. Volumes on the 130 put, however, have a negative
effect on the 70 put IV. This is only partially mirrored for the IV of the 130 put: activity on
the 70 put does not significantly affect it, at the 5% threshold. The 100 put IV is positively
affected by flows on the 70 put and negatively by flows on the 130. Again, this is not fully
mirrored in the 130 put, where the volumes on the 100 put actually increase the 130 put IV.
Turning to the curvature, it increases with activity on the spot and the 70 and 130 puts,
but decreases with volumes on the 100 put. Adding time control does not affect the flow
coefficients, but we can see that time passing does increase each of the IVs significantly, but
not the curvature.
All in all, it appears the volumes on the different available options will determine the
shape of the IV smile. This establishes a clear theoretical foundation to link asymmetric
information and differences in IV. This also presents with an opportunity to calibrate the
model on observed IV smiles/smirks.
5. Conclusion
This paper develops a methodology to prove the existence of, and characterize the equilibrium
in a very flexible multi-asset continuous-time Kyle-Back model, using the tools of optimal
transport. It relaxes many of the limitations in the existing literature. There is no theoretical
limitation on the number of assets and derivatives in the model. Options do not have to be
at-the-money. The prior of the price distribution does not have to be Gaussian. There are few
restrictions on the variance-covariance matrix of the uninformed traders, other than (quite
natural) positive-definiteness. In fact, the current formulation of the model accommodate
deterministically time-varying noise. We demonstrate how numerical methods efficiently help
apply the model in cases where no easy conjecture is available on the shape of the transport
map. This leads us to simulation results showing how the IV smile can be created by relative
order flows under asymmetric information.
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Our approach holds a lot of promise as to the number of issues it allows to address. Besides
efficient pricing, the paradigm could also be used to assess the desirable and unintended
consequences of informed trader and transparency regulation for market equilibrium. The
flexibility of our method should be well-suited to applications on intraday trades and quotes
data. In particular, a subject of prime importance is whether one can fully calibrate our
model on financial data. The calibration of σ can be directly performed by observing the
order flow Y . Then, the fundamental question is whether by observing real market prices
(Hmarket(ti, yti))i and trading volumes (yti)i, one can find the distribution ν. We conjecture
that such a calibration can be done by a stochastic gradient descent method.
A natural extension of our setting will be to allow for stochastic flows from noise traders,
along the lines of Collin-Dufresne and Fos (2016). Indeed, our methodology simply transform
the non-Gaussian price v˜ into Gaussian ξ so that the filtering problem is only carried out
in a Gaussian framework. We conjecture that it would be possible to combine our approach
with Collin-Dufresne and Fos (2016) to establish an equilibrium.
Additional extension to the case where the market maker or the informed trader are risk
averse are possible. Other more difficult extensions are worth investigating. For example,
even though noise traders are not sophisticated, it is not unimaginable that total flow has a
feedback effect on their trading pattern. As such, allowing the volatility of noise trading to
depend upon the volume is a promising avenue for future research.
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Figure 1: Sample Path for the Spot and Call Case (Lognormal Prior, In-The-Money at
Expiry)
This figure shows price maps for a particular parametrization of the model. Noise is multi-
variate Gaussian with mean 0 and variance 4 for each asset; covariances are −2 to match
the Back (1993) restriction. The price prior is lognormal with mean 100 and volatility 20%.
Space is discretized from −5 to 5 for each noise component, and four standard deviations
around the mean for the price. We use 101 steps for each of the three dimensions. The strike
price is K = 100. The first and second panels show the (anti-correlated) Brownian noise
process for the spot and the , respectively. The third panel shows the equilibrium spot price
quoted by the market maker as order flows arrive. The fourth panel shows the call price
quoted by the market maker in blue, and the Black-Scholes price based on the spot price
from panel 3 and a 20% implied volatility, which is that of the market marker’s prior, in
green.
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Figure 2: Sample Path for the Spot and Call Case (Lognormal Prior, Out-of-The-Money at
Expiry)
This figure shows a random sample path for a particular parametrization of the model.
The model includes a spot asset and a European call with strike price K = 100. Noise is
multivariate Gaussian with mean 0 and variance 4 for each asset; covariances are −2 to match
the Back (1993) restriction. The price prior is lognormal with mean 100 and volatility 20%.
Space is discretized from −5 to 5 for each noise component, and four standard deviations
around the mean for the price. We use 101 steps for each of the three dimensions. The strike
price is K = 100. The first and second panels show the (anti-correlated) Brownian noise
process for the spot and the call respectively. The third panel shows the equilibrium spot
price quoted by the market maker as order flows arrive. The fourth panel shows the call
price quoted by the market maker in blue, and the Black-Scholes price based on the spot
price from panel 3 and a 20% implied volatility.
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Figure 3: Price Map of Spot and Call Based on Noise Volumes (Lognormal Prior)
This figure shows the price map based on spot and option volumes for a particular
parametrization of the model. The model includes a spot asset and a European call with
strike price K = 100. Noise is multivariate Gaussian with mean 0 and variance 4 for each
asset; covariances are −2 to match the Back (1993) restriction. The price prior is lognormal
with mean 100 and volatility 20%. Space is discretized from −5 to 5 for each noise compo-
nent, and four standard deviations around the mean for the price. We use 101 steps for each
of the three dimensions. We consider five different times from 0 to 1.
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Figure 4: Sample Path for the Spot, Call, and Put Case (Lognormal Prior, Call In-The-Money
at Expiry)
Noise is multivariate Gaussian with mean 0 and variance 4 for each asset; covariances with
the spot are −2 to match the Back (1993) restriction. Noise covariance between the call and
put is 2. The price prior is lognormal with mean 100 and volatility 20%. Space is discretized
from −5 to 5 for each noise component, and four standard deviations around the mean for
the price. We use 101 steps for each of the three dimensions. The strike price is K = 100.
The first three panels show the (anti-correlated) Brownians noise process for the spot, the
call, and the put respectively. The fourth panel shows the equilibrium spot price quoted by
the market maker as order flows arrive. The fifth and sixth panel shows the call and put
prices quoted by the market maker in blue, and the Black-Scholes price based on the spot
price from panel 3 and a 20% implied volatility.
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Figure 5: Black-Scholes Implied Volatility Curvature for Different Noise Schemes
This figure summarizes the curvature of the Black-Scholes implied volatility 1000 Brownian
paths drawn for one spot asset and three put options with strikes 70, 100 and 130. The
curvature is computed as the sum of the IVs of the “outside” strikes minus twice the IV of
the middle strike, divided by the distance between the outside strikes. The market maker
starts with a lognormal prior one the spot price with mean 100 and volatility 20%. The
volumes of the noise are drawn with mean zero noise and a different variance-covariance
according to three different schemes in Panels A through C:
Σ1 =

1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
 , Σ2 =

4 0 0 0
0 4 0 0
0 0 4 0
0 0 0 4
 , Σ3 =

4 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1

Each path is discretized into 20 time steps. The noise is discretized into a 30-step grid on
each of the four dimensions, and the final price into a 500-step grid. Implied volatilities are
standard Black-Scholes IVs given the spot and option prices. The crossbars show the mean
curvature and one standard deviation on each side. The faint blue lines show the 1,000 IV
trajectories (with y axis truncated).
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Figure 6: Black-Scholes Implied Volatility Curvature for Different Strikes
This figure summarizes the curvature of the Black-Scholes implied volatility over 1000 Brown-
ian paths drawn for one spot asset and three put options with different strikes. The curvature
is computed as the sum of the IVs of the “outside” strikes minus twice the IV of the middle
strike, divided by the distance between the outside strikes. Panel A shows strikes 70, 100
and 130. Panel B shows strikes 95, 100 and 105. Panel C shows strikes 70, 100 and 105. The
market maker starts with a lognormal prior one the spot price with mean 100 and volatility
20%. The volumes of the noise are drawn with mean zero noise and a identity matrix as
variance-covariance:
Σ1 =

1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1

Each path is discretized into 20 time steps. The noise is discretized into a 30-step grid on
each of the four dimensions, and the final price into a 500-step grid. Implied volatilities are
standard Black-Scholes IVs given the spot and option prices. The crossbars show the mean
curvature and one standard deviation on each side. The faint blue lines show the 1,000 IV
trajectories (with y axis truncated).
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Table I: Panel Regression for Black-Scholes Implied Volatility and Order Flows with Three
Puts (Noise Scheme 1)
This table compiles panel regressions of the Black-Scholes implied volatility and its curvature
over 1000 Brownian paths drawn for one spot asset and three put options with strikes 70,
100 and 130. The curvature is computed as the sum of the IVs of the “outside” strikes minus
twice the IV of the middle strike, divided by the distance between the outside strikes. The
market maker starts with a lognormal prior one the spot price with mean 100 and volatility
20%. The volumes of the noise are drawn with mean zero noise and a identity matrix as
variance-covariance:
Σ1 =

1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1

Each path is discretized into 20 time steps. The noise is discretized into a 30-step grid on
each of the four dimensions, and the final price into a 500-step grid. Implied volatilities are
standard Black-Scholes IVs given the spot and option prices. The dependent variable of the
regression is the IV of the put at 70 in columns (1) and (2), of the put at 100 in columns
(3) and (4), of the put at 130 in columns (5) and (6), and the curvature (×105) in columns
(7) and (8). Independent variables are the order flows for the spot and each of the puts, as
well as time (from 0 to 0.95) in columns (2), (4), (6), and (8). Standard errors are clustered
at the path and time levels.
IV (P70) IV (P100) IV (P130) IV Curvature
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Intercept 0.213∗∗∗ 0.192∗∗∗ 0.217∗∗∗ 0.194∗∗∗ 0.221∗∗∗ 0.189∗∗∗ 0.914 −10.255∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (3.486) (5.177)
Spot Volume 0.017∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 10.508∗∗∗ 10.537∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (2.700) (2.671)
P70 Volume 0.045∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗ 0.002∗∗ 0.002∗ 0.002 70.964∗∗∗ 70.874∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (3.767) (3.748)
P100 Volume 0.020∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ −192.519∗∗∗ −192.426∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (12.167) (12.127)
P130 Volume −0.010∗∗∗ −0.010∗∗∗ −0.008∗∗∗ −0.008∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗ 107.567∗∗∗ 107.529∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (6.711) (6.705)
Time 0.044∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗ 23.516
(0.008) (0.006) (0.012) (16.886)
Obs. 20,000 20,000 20,000 20,000 20,000 20,000 20,000 20,000
Adj. R2 0.753 0.790 0.630 0.705 0.604 0.673 0.761 0.763
Res. S.E. 0.036 0.033 0.028 0.025 0.046 0.042 0.001 0.001
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Appendices
A. Optimal Transport Preliminaries
This appendix summarizes some well-known results in optimal transport literature.
We denote by Π(α, β) the set of probability distributions Q on R2n such that∫
y∈Rn
Q(dx1, . . . , dxn, dy1, . . . , dyn) = α(dx) and
∫
x∈Rn
Q(dx1, . . . , dxn, dy1, . . . , dyn) = β(dy)
where the first integral is over dy and the second one on dx.
By definition under Q ∈ Π(α, β) the first n coordinate S1 ∈ Rn and the last n coordinates
S2 ∈ Rn are, respectively, of law α and β. Note that for a mapping M so that M pushes α
forward to β, the measure defined by
Q(dx, dy) = δM(x)(dy)α(dx)
is in Π(α, β).
The fundamental problem in optimal transport theory is the study of the Monge problem
inf
M :M]α=β
∫
Rn
|x−M(x)|2α(dx) (A.1)
and its relaxation by Monge-Kantorovich as follows:
inf
Q∈Π(α,β)
∫
R2n
|x− y|2Q(dx, dy) = inf
Q∈Π(α,β)
EQ
[|S1 − S2|2] . (A.2)
The following theorem is one of the fundamental results of the optimal transport theory.
Its proof can be found in Brenier (1991, Theorem 3.1) or McCann (1995, Main Theorem):
Theorem 2 (Brenier’s Theorem). Let α, β be two measures on Rn such that α is absolutely
continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure. Then there exists a unique (on the support
of α and up to an additive constant) convex function Γ so that ∇Γ pushes α forward to
β. ∇Γ also provides an optimizer in the Monge optimal transport problem (A.1) and the
measure Q∗ ∈ Π(α, β) defined by
Q∗(dx, dy) = δ{∇Γ(x)}(dy)α(dx)
is an optimizer for the Monge-Kantorovich problem (A.2).
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A.1. Proof of Corollary 1
The existence of Γ is a consequence of Theorem 2 and its properties can be found in (Brenier,
1991, Proposition 3.1). Note that Γ is defined up to an additive constant. Independently of
Corollary 1, in Lemma 1, we show that for any choice of Γ, Γ(ZT ) is integrable. Therefore,
we can choose the additive constant to insure E[Γ(ZT )] = 0
We now construct ζ. Recall the measure Q∗ ∈ Π(µ, ν) constructed in Theorem 2. There
exists a disintegration of the measure Q∗ on ν, meaning there exists a mapping that we also
denote Q∗ so that
• Q∗(dx, dy) = Q∗(dx, y)ν(dy),
• y ∈ Rn 7→ Q∗(A, y) is measurable for any Borel measurable subset A of Rn
• for ν almost every y ∈ Rn, the measure Q∗(dx, y) is supported in (∇Γ)−1(y) := {z ∈
Rn : ∇Γ(z) = y}.
If ν is absolutely continuous, it is well-known (see Brenier, 1991, Proposition 3.1) that
∇Γ is bijective and its inverse denoted (∇Γ)−1 is the optimal transport map of ν onto µ.
Therefore Q∗(dx, y) = δ{(∇Γ)−1(y)}(dx) and the random variable (∇Γ)−1(v˜) has distribution
µ. Note that this construction does not use U .
If ν is not absolutely continuous, ∇Γ might fail to be injective. For all v ∈ Rn, given
the probabilty measure Q∗(dx, v), we use the Brenier’s theorem to have the existence of a
function fv : Rn 7→ Rn so that fv(U) has distribution Q∗(dx, v). Since fv(U) is supported in
(∇Γ)−1(v) we have that ∇Γ(fv(U)) = v. It is now also clear that since v˜ has distribution ν,
from the perspective of the market maker, the distribution of fv˜(U) is µ and we can take
ζ = fv˜(U).
B. Proofs
B.1. Informed Trader’s Problem
Proof of Lemma 1. We first prove the integrability of (3.3) and (3.4). By defintion of Γ,
∇Γ
(∫ T
0
σsdWs
)
has distribution ν and therefore, thanks to the Holder inequality, and the
exponential moments of the Gaussian distribution, there exists  > 0 so that
E
[
exp
(

∣∣∣∣∫ T
0
σsdWs
∣∣∣∣) ∣∣∣∣∇Γ(∫ T
0
σsdWs
)∣∣∣∣2+p/2
]
<∞.
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By conditioning and Fubini’s theorem, for (t, y) = (0, 0) or for all t ∈ (0, T ] and Lebesgue
almost every y ∈ Rn we have that
E
[
exp
(

∣∣∣∣y + ∫ T
t
σsdWs
∣∣∣∣) ∣∣∣∣∇Γ(y + ∫ T
t
σsdWs
)∣∣∣∣2+p/2
]
<∞ (B.1)
which shows that (3.3) is well defined for such (t, y).
The convexity of Γ implies that for all y ∈ Rn and s ∈ (0, 1) we have
(∇Γ(y)−∇Γ(sy))>((1− s)y) ≥ 0 and (∇Γ(sy)−∇Γ(0))>(sy) ≥ 0.
By direct estimates, there exists a constant C > 0 such that
C
(
|y|2+8/p + |∇Γ(y)| 8+2p8+p
)
≥ y>∇Γ(y) ≥
∫ 1
0
y>∇Γ(sy)ds ≥ Γ(y)− Γ(0) ≥ y>∇Γ(0)
≥ −C
(
|y|2+8/p + |∇Γ(0)| 8+2p8+p
)
.
and therefore up to taking C > 0 larger we have
C
(|y|(2+8/p)(2+p/4) + |∇Γ(y)|2+p/2 + 1) ≥ |Γ(y)|2+p/4
which implies that
E
[
exp
(

∣∣∣∣∫ T
0
σsdWs
∣∣∣∣) ∣∣∣∣Γ(∫ T
0
σsdWs
)∣∣∣∣2+p/4
]
<∞
for eventually smaller  > 0. Similarly as above, for (t, y) = (0, 0) or for all t ∈ (0, T ] and
Lebesgue almost every y, we can show by conditioning and Fubini’s theorem that (3.4) is
well defined.
We now extend this integrability of (3.3) to all y. The proof of the extension for (3.4)
can be done similarly. We fix t ∈ (0, T ), y ∈ Rn in the set of full measure where (B.1) holds
and y′ ∈ Rn satisfying |y − y′| × |(Σ2t )−1| ≤ ε. For all x ∈ Rn, the Gaussian kernel satisfies
|e− 12 (x−y)>(Σ2t )−1(x−y) − e− 12 (x−y′)>(Σ2t )−1(x−y′)|
= e−
1
2
(x−y)>(Σ2t )−1(x−y)|1− e(y′−y)>(Σ2t )−1(x− y+y
′
2
)|
≤ |y − y′| × |(Σ2t )−1|eε
∣∣∣ y+y′2 ∣∣∣e− 12 (x−y)>(Σ2t )−1(x−y)eε|x|. (B.2)
We now have that, for all |y − y′| × |(Σ2t )−1| ≤ ε, the integrability of
E
[
exp
(
ε
∣∣∣∣y + ∫ T
t
σsdWs
∣∣∣∣) ∣∣∣∣∇Γ(y + ∫ T
t
σsdWs
)∣∣∣∣2+p/2
]
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implies the integrability of
E
[
exp
(
ε
∣∣∣∣y′ + ∫ T
t
σsdWs
∣∣∣∣) ∣∣∣∣∇Γ(y′ + ∫ T
t
σsdWs
)∣∣∣∣2+p/2
]
.
Therefore, H(t, y′) is well-defined and in fact satisfies
|H(t, y)−H(t, y′)|
≤ |y − y
′||(Σ2t )−1|eε
∣∣∣ y+y′2 ∣∣∣
2pi
√
det(Σ2t )
∫
Rn
|∇Γ(x)|e− 12 (x−y)>(Σ2t )−1(x−y)eε|x|dx.
Additionally, for all t ∈ (0, T ), y 7→ H(t, y) is locally Lipschitz continuous. Being locally
Lipschitz,
H i(t, y) =
1
2pi
√
det(Σ2t )
∫
Rn
∂xiΓ(x)e
− 1
2
(x−y)>(Σ2t )−1(x−y)dx (B.3)
is almost everywhere differentiable for i = 1, . . . , n. We can now repeat the same argu-
ments above with the function ∂xiΓ(x)(Σ2t )−1(x − y) instead of ∇Γ(x) and show that the
formal derivative of (B.3)
∇H i(t, y) = 1
2pi
√
det(Σ2t )
∫
Rn
∂xiΓ(x)(Σ
2
t )
−1(x− y)e− 12 (x−y)>(Σ2t )−1(x−y)dx.
is in fact the derivative of H i. One can now use the upper bound (B.2) and repeat the
arguments above to show that H i and (t, y) 7→ Γ(t, y) are smooth solutions of (3.5) on
(0, T ) × Rn and both functions are continuous at (0, 0). Similarly (B.2) and a Dominated
Convergence Theorem allows us to obtain (3.6).
Finally, for all t ∈ [0, T ], H(t, Zt) = E[∇Γ(ZT )|σ(Ws, s ≤ t)]. Therefore, by the Jensen
inequality, we have
E[|H(t, Zt)|2] ≤ E[|∇Γ(ZT )|2] <∞
and we obtain (2.6).
Given the smoothness of Γ and H, we can now easily establish the dynamic programming
principle
H i(t, y) := E
[
H i
(
τ, y +
∫ τ
t
σsdWs
)]
for all stopping times τ . This easily yields to (3.5).
Proof of Lemma 2. Note that Γ satisfies,
∂tΓ(t, y) + Tr
(
σ2t
2
∂2yyΓ(t, y)
)
= 0 for (t, y) ∈ [0, T )× Rn,
with final condition Γ(T, y) = Γ(y), for all y ∈ Rn.
(B.4)
(B.5)
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and by assumption on Γ(·), Γ(0, 0) = E[Γ(ZT )] = 0. Due to the stochastic representation
(3.4), it is clear that for all t ∈ (0, T ], y 7→ Γ(t, y) is convex. The smoothness of Γ proven in
Lemma 1 implies then easily that {∂2yiyjΓ(t, y)}i,j=1,...n is a symmetric positive semi-definite
matrix. Without loss of generality, we fix a trading strategy X of the informed trader, so
that dXt = dAXt + σXt dWt where (AX , σX) are the semi-martingale characteristics of X. By
Ito’s formula and the condition E[Γ(ZT )] = 0, the dynamics of Y , dYt = dAXt +(σXt +σt)dWt,
yields for t ∈ (0, T ) to
dΓ(t, Yt) =
1
2
Tr
(
((σXt + σt)
2 − σ2t )∂2yyΓ(t, Yt)
)
dt+H>(t, Yt)dXt +H>(t, Yt)dZt
= Tr
(
(σXt σt +
1
2
(σXt )
2)∂2yyΓ(t, Yt)
)
dt+H>(t, Yt)dXt +H>(t, Yt)dZt
where we have used (B.4) to simplify ∂tΓ. Note also that by a direct computation
d
n∑
i=1
〈X i, H i(·, Y·)〉t = Tr
(
σXt (σt + σ
X
t )∂
2
yyΓ(t, Yt)
)
dt.
Thus, the dynamics of Γ(t, Yt) and the inequality (2.7) yields for all ε ∈ (0, T/2) to
E
[∫ T−ε
ε
(v −H(t, Yt))>dXt −
n∑
i=1
〈X i, H i(·, Y·)〉T−ε − 〈X i, H i(·, Y·)〉ε
]
= E
[
v>(YT−ε − Yε)− Γ(T − ε, YT−ε) + Γ(ε, Yε)−
∫ T−ε
ε
Tr
(
1
2
(σXt )
2∂2yyΓ(t, Yt)
)
dt
]
Note that H(·, Y·) might have jumps at 0 and T . However, X is assumed to be continuous.
Therefore, t ∈ [0, T ] 7→ 〈X i, H i(·, Y·)〉t is continuous and square integrable. Additionally, by
the convexity of Γ,
T r
(
1
2
(σXt )
2∂2yyΓ(t, Yt)
)
≥ 0.
Therefore we can send ε to 0 to obtain
E
[∫ T
0
(v −H(t, Yt))>dXt −
n∑
i=1
〈X i, H i(·, Y·)〉T
]
= E
[
v>YT − Γ(YT )−
∫ T
0
Tr
(
1
2
(σXt )
2∂2yyΓ(t, Yt)
)
dt
]
= E
[
v>YT − Γ(YT )− 1
2
n∑
i,j=1
∫ T
0
n∑
i,j=1
∂2yiyjΓ(t, Yt)d〈X i, Xj〉t
]
(B.6)
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Proof of Proposition 1. Due to the convexity of Γ(y), the function Γ(t, y) is convex and
therefore
1
2
n∑
i,j=1
∫ T
0
n∑
i,j=1
∂2yiyjΓ(t, Yt)d〈X i, Xj〉t ≥ 0
for any trading strategy X and the right hand side of (B.6) is bounded from above by Γ∗(v).
Note that this inequality also shows that any martingale part of the trading strategy of the
informed trader will be costly to the informed trader.
We now show that for our candidate strategy (3.11) this upper bound Γ∗(v) is achieved.
It is well known (see Rockafellar (1970)) that the supremum in (3.8) is achieved at any
y ∈ Rn satisfying ∇Γ(y) = v.
By our construction ∇Γ(ζ) = v almost surely. Additionally, for the strategy defined at
(3.11), we have that σX = 0. Thus, in order to obtain the optimality of the candidate strategy
(3.11), it is sufficient to show that the solution of (3.11) satisfies YT = ζ. Note that by a
direct computation the solution of (3.11) is
Yt = (In − Σ2t (Σ20)−1)ζ + Σ2t
∫ t
0
(Σ2s)
−1σsdWs. (B.7)
where In is the identity matrix of dimension n.
As symmetric matrices, we have σIn ≥ σt ≥ σIn for some positive constants σ > σ > 0
and by integration (T − s)σ2In ≥ Σ2s ≥ (T − s)σ2In. These inequalities and the Ito isom-
etry easily imply that Σ
2
t√
T−t
∫ t
0
(Σ2s)
−1σsdWs is bounded in L2. Therefore Σ2t
∫ t
0
(Σ2s)
−1σsdWs
converges to 0 in L2 and almost surely as t→ T , which concludes the proof of optimality of
(3.11).
B.2. Market Maker’s Problem
Proof of Proposition 2. At time t = 0 the market maker knows the a priori distribution of ζ
which is Gaussian by construction. Thanks to Liptser and Shiryaev (2001)[Theorem 12.7],
conditionally on FYt , ζ is normally distributed with mean denoted mt and variance denoted
Vt that are the unique continuous solutions to
dmt = Vt(Σ
2
t )
−1σ2t (σ
2
t )
−1(dYt − σ2t (Σ2t )−1(mt − Yt)dt)
dVt = −Vt(Σ2t )−1σ2t (σ2t )−1σ2t (Σ2t )−1V >t dt
(B.8)
(B.9)
with intial conditions V0 = Σ20 and m0 = Y0 = 0. Note that Vt = Σ2t solves (B.9) and thus,
by uniqueness, Vt = Σ2t for all t ∈ [0, T ]. We inject this equality into (B.8) to obtain
dmt = dYt − σ2t (Σ2t )−1(mt − Yt)dt.
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Thus, by uniqueness of solutions of this linear stochastic differential equation (SDE), we
obtain that
Y = m
and this proves that conditionally on FYt , ζ is N(Yt,Σ2t ). Note that regardless of the absolute
continuity of ν, by construction, we have v = ∇Γ(ζ).
Thus, we have the following equalities that complete the proof of the proposition
E[v˜|FYt ] = E[∇Γ(ζ)|FYt ] = E
[
∇Γ
(
y +
∫ T
t
σsdWs
)]
y=Yt
= H(t, Yt)
B.3. Case of a Stock with a Call Option
Proof of Proposition 3. Given the continuity of pl, pr, F−1νS and B, to obtain the continuity
of Γ, it is sufficient to prove this continuity on the graph of B. This continuity holds if∫ x
0
fl(z)dz =
∫ x+B(x)
B(0)
fr(z)dz −K(B(x)−B(0)) for all x ∈ R. (B.10)
Note that (B.10) holds for x = 0. Thus, it is sufficient to show the equality of the derivatives
of both sides of (B.10) in x, which is
fl(x)− fr(x+B(x)) = B′(x)(fr(x+B(x))−K) for all x ∈ R.
This is equivalent to (4.12) and we conclude the proof of continuity of Γ.
We now show the convexity of Γ by showing that for all (xi, yi) ∈ R2, i = 1, 2 we have
that
(∇Γ(x2, y2)−∇Γ(x1, y1))>((x2, y2)− (x1, y1)) ≥ 0. (B.11)
Given the symmetry of the statement in (x1, y1), (x2, y2) and the fact that Γ is convex on
both sets {y ≤ B(x)} and {y > B(x)}, without loss of generality we assume that
B(x2) < y2 and B(x1) ≥ y1 (B.12)
and expand (B.11) to
(fr(x2 + y2)−K)(x2 + y2 − (x1 + y1)) + (K − fl(x1))(x2 − x1). (B.13)
Note that the derivative of (B.13) in y1 is K − fr(x2 + y2) which is non positive due to the
monotonicity of fr and its limit at +∞. Thus, by the assumption y1 ≤ B(x1), the expression
(B.13) is larger or equal than
(fr(x2 + y2)−K)(x2 + y2 − (x1 +B(x1))) + (K − fl(x1))(x2 − x1). (B.14)
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We now differentiate this expression in y2 to obtain
f ′r(x2 + y2)(x2 + y2 − (x1 +B(x1))) + fr(x2 + y2)−K. (B.15)
We now show that (B.14) is non negative if x2 ≤ x1. We treat the other case below. Due
to the monotonicity of x+B(x) and the assumption (B.12),
x2 + y2 > x2 +B(x2) ≥ x1 +B(x1).
Thus, (B.15) yields that if x2 ≤ x1 (B.14) is increasing in y2 and as a consequence of (B.12)
it is bounded from below by
(fr(x2 +B(x2))−K)(x2 +B(x2)− (x1 +B(x1))) + (K − fl(x1))(x2 − x1). (B.16)
Let x ∈ [x2, x1], then the fact that fl and fr are increasing and x 7→ x+ B(x) is decreasing
implies that
K − fl(x)
K − fl(x1) ≥ 1 ≥
fr(x+B(x))−K
fr(x2 +B(x2))−K (B.17)
which yields thanks to (4.12) to
x2 +B(x2)− (x1 +B(x1)) =
∫ x1
x2
K − fl(x)
fr(x+B(x))−Kdx ≥ (x1 − x2)
K − fl(x1)
fr(x2 +B(x2))−K .
Thanks to the inequality fr ≥ K, we rearrange these terms to obtain that (B.16) (and
therefore (B.14)) is non negative in the case x2 ≤ x1.
In order to complete the proof of convexity, we now assume that x2 > x1. Note that for
any y2 satisfying y2 ≥ x1 +B(x1)−x2, (B.15) is non negative. Thus, the minimum of (B.14)
in y2 is achieved at a value satisfying y2 ≤ x1 +B(x1)−x2. Given also the assumption (B.12),
in order to show that (B.14) is non negative we can without loss of generality assume that
x2 +B(x2) < x2 + y2 ≤ x1 +B(x1).
Let x3 be defined by x3 + B(x3) = x2 + y2. By the strict monotonicity of x + B(x) this
implies that x2 > x3 ≥ x1 and we can write (B.14) as
(fr(x3 +B(x3))−K)(x3 +B(x3)− (x1 +B(x1))) + (K − fl(x1))(x3 − x1)
+ (K − fl(x1))(x2 − x3). (B.18)
The second line being non negative, in order to finish the proof, it is sufficient to prove that
(fr(x3 +B(x3))−K)(x3 +B(x3)− (x1 +B(x1))) + (K − fl(x1))(x3 − x1) ≥ 0 (B.19)
for x3 > x1. Similarly to (B.17), for all x ∈ (x1, x3), we have that
K − fl(x1)
K − fl(x) ≥ 1 ≥
fr(x3 +B(x3))−K
fr(x+B(x))−K .
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Rearranging the terms and integrating we obtain
K − fl(x1)
fr(x3 +B(x3))−K ≥
1
x3 − x1
∫ x3
x1
K − fl(x)
fr(x+B(x))−Kdx
≥ 1
x3 − x1 (x1 +B(x1)− (x3 +B(x3)))
which implies (B.19) and concludes the proof of the convexity of Γ.
Proof of Lemma 3. We fix R > 1. Under the assumptions of the Lemma for all u < qK < v,
we have
F−1
νS
(u)−K ≤ −ε ≤ ε ≤ F−1
νS
(v)−K. (B.20)
One can find smooth increasing maps φ1,R, φ2,R : [0, 1] 7→ R so that for all u, v ∈ [0, 1],
0 ≤ φ1,R(u) ≤ qK −R−1, qK +R−1 ≤ φ2,R(v) ≤ 1
and for all 0 ≤ u < qK < v ≤ 1
φ1,R(u) ↑ u and φ2,R(v) ↓ v as R ↑ ∞.
For i = 1, 2, denote Fi,R(u) = F−1νS (φi,R(u)) and (Ab,R, Bb,R) the solution of the ODE
Ab,R(x) =
∫ x
−R
p2(s, Bb,R(s))ds
Bb,R(x) = b− (x+R) +
∫ x
−R
F1,R (Ab,R(s))−K
F2,R (p4(s, s+Bb,R(s)) + Ab,R(s))−Kds.
(B.21)
Note that due to the choice of φi,R, the data of this ODE is Lipschitz in (Ab,R, Bb,R) and the
solutions exist and depend continuously on b. We can also differentiate the solution of the
ODE in b to find that
∂bAb,R(x) =
∫ x
−R
p(s,Bb,R(s))∂bBb,R(s)ds
∂bBb,R(x) = 1 +
∫ x
−R
(F1,R)
′ (Ab,R(s)) (F2,R (p4(s, s+Bb,R(s)) +Ab,R(s))−K)
(F2,R
(
p4(s, s+Bb,R(s)) +Ab,R(s)
)−K)2 ∂bAb,R(s)ds
−
∫ x
−R
(F1,R
(
Ab,R(s)
)−K)(F2,R)′ (p4(s, s+Bb,R(s)) +Ab,R(s))
(F2,R
(
p4(s, s+Bb,R(s)) +Ab,R(s)
)−K)2 ∂bAb,R(s)ds
−
∫ x
−R
(F1,R
(
Ab,R(s)
)−K)(F2,R)′ (p4(s, s+Bb,R(s)) +Ab,R(s)) p3(s,Bb,R(s))
(F2,R
(
p4(s, s+Bb,R(s)) +Ab,R(s)
)−K)2 ∂bBb,R(s)ds.
The signs of F2,R (p4(s, s+Bb,R(s)) + Ab,R(s))−K, F1,R (Ab,R(s))−K and the monotonicity
of F−1
νS
shows that
sign(∂bAb,R(x)) = sign(x+R), sign(∂bBb,R(x)) = 1.
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Thus, the function
b 7→
∫ x
−R
p2(s, Bb,R(s))ds
is increasing and continuous and therefore there exists bR so that it is 0.
Note that the set {AbR,R(0) : R > 1} is bounded. Thus, we can take a subsequence
that converges. Additionally, {AbR,R : R > 1} is equicontinuous and bounded on bounded
sets. Therefore, thanks to Arzela Ascoli theorem, we can take a further subsequence so that
AbR,R → A∞ uniformly on compact sets that is increasing and satisfies limx→−∞A∞(x) = 0
and limx→∞A∞(x) = qK and hence satisfy 0 < A∞(x) < qK .
Note that due to (B.20) B′bR,R ∈ (−ε−1,−1). Thus, if {BbR,R(0) : R > 1} admits a
subsequence diverging to ±∞, BbR,R(x) also diverges to the same limit for all x. Thus,
AbR,R(x) either converges to 0 or to 1 which is in contradiction with limx→∞A∞(x) = qK .
Therefore, we conclude that {BbR,R(0) : R > 1} is also bounded. Similarly to A, we
can take a subsequence converging to B∞ uniformly on compact sets. One can show that
p4(s, s+Bb,R(s))+Ab,R(s) is decreasing and satisfies limx→−∞ p4(s, s+Bb,R(s))+Ab,R(s) = 1
and limx→∞ p4(s, s + Bb,R(s)) + Ab,R(s) = qK . It is now easy to see that (A∞, B∞) solves
(4.6).
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